欧美无码

时刻：2022年4月23日 星期六

主题：第四届中国行径与实验经济学论坛 China Behavioral and Experimental Economic Forum 2022  

主办单元：北京师范大学经济与工商料理学院、北京师范大学数学科学学院、经济研究杂志社

经办单元：北京师范大学经济与工商料理学院行径与博弈决策实验室

为推动行径与实验经济学在中国的发展，促进行径与实验经济学各领域的疏导与协调，推动新文科建造，北京大学光华料理学院、北京师范大学经济与工商料理学院、东北财经大学实验经济学实验室、复旦大学料理学院、华东师范大学经济与料理学部、华南师范大学经济与料理学院、暨南大学经济学院、经济研究杂志社、南京审计大学泽尔腾经济学实验室、清华大学经济料理学院、山东大学类脑经济学研究院、上海财经大学经济学院、上海交通大学安泰经济与料理学院、上国际国语大学国际工商料理学院、武汉大学经济与料理学院、厦门大学王亚南经济研究院、浙江财经大学经济行径与决策研究中心、浙江大学经济学院、浙江工商大学经济学院、中国东说念主民大学经济学院、中山大学政事与大众事务料理学院（以上单元按称号音序罗列）于2018年共同发起“中国行径与实验经济学论坛” (China Behavioral and Experimental Economics Forum，简称China BEEF)。本论坛根据《中国行径与实验经济学论坛规矩》，拟每年由各发起单元顺序举办一届年会以偏激它联系学术公益行动，旨在促进行径与实验经济学领域学者偏激前沿研究后果的广阔深化疏导，推动中国行径与实验经济学的表面与法子改进，栽种中国行径与实验经济学领域的优秀学术后果，打造行径与实验经济学原土化和国际化的可接续发展的最高水平学术疏导平台。

经论坛学术委员会讨论决定，第四届“中国行径与实验经济学论坛(2022)”定于2022年4月23日在北京师范大学举行，论坛经办单元为北京师范大学经济与工商料理学院与北京师范大学数学科学学院。会议接纳腾讯会议平台，请检讨各场会议号。

论坛截稿前共收到稿件97篇，经过初审、委员会匿名评审，最终进入会议讲述论文54篇。论坛共设9个分论坛，来自印第安纳大学、阿肯色大学等国际盛名大学，以及清华大学、北京大学、中国东说念主民大学、中国科学院大学、浙江大学、复旦大学、南京大学、北京师范大学、华东师范大学、华南师范大学、南开大学、武汉大学、厦门大学、上国际国语大学、南京审计大学、上海财经大学、东北财经大学、西南财经大学、中南财经政法大学、中央财经大学、浙江财经大学、北京交通大学、中央民族大学、山东大学、中国海洋大学、中南大学、电子科技大学、南边科技大学、深圳大学、华南农业大学等国内大学的多名学者将在论坛张开学术疏导和讨论。

特邀讲述东说念主

（姓氏字母排序）

第四届论坛主办和实践通告长

论坛常设通告处

特邀讲述摘抄

行径运筹与料理几许研究

赵晓波 (清华大学)

常常，运筹与料理以“演绎”为主要的研究范式。而行径运筹与料理，不仅袭取“演绎”的研究范式，更要接纳“归纳”的研究范式来开展研究。在夙昔十多年里，学者们主要通过想象和实施基于运作料理布景的实验室实验，检会决策者在各式不倒霉境下的个体决策偏好(Individual decision biases)和多东说念主博弈环境下的应酬偏好(Social preferences)，以及它们对系统绩效的影响。近期，研究责任已启动聚焦在何如想象灵验的纠偏机制(Debiasing mechanism)，以达到矫正系统绩效的目的。在将来，行径运筹与料理的一个主要发展趋势是连络东说念主工智能来开展研究。举例，在微不雅层面，检会决策者在各式运作料理情境下的大脑神经行动机理；在宏不雅层面，检会决策者在各式大数据环境下的行径律例。

Reciprocity, image motivation and volunteering:

An experiment with children in Colombia

Sherry Li (University of Arkansas), Natalia Candelo (Queens College CUNY),

Jiabin Wu (University of Oregon)

We design a lab-in-the-field experiment to investigate children’s volunteering behavior in Colombia. Children of 4 to 12 years old decide how to allocate their time in real-effort tasks to earn money for themselves or the matched child-in-need in response to a personalized gift with low visibility, a similar gift with high visibility, a choice of gifts, or no gift. We extend Bénabou and Tirole’s (2006) model and examine how participants make tradeoffs among altruism, reciprocity, and image motivation in decision making. We find that participants reciprocate by allocating more time to work for the child-in-need when receiving a gift than when there is no gift. Volunteering does not differ in individuals’ responses to the low or high visibility gifts separately. However, participants self-select into their preferred gift type when given a choice in the Choice treatment. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, those who prefer the high visibility gift reveal stronger image motivation, whereas those who prefer the low visibility gift reveal more substantial reciprocity. This research provides insights into the determinants of pro-social behavior of children who were exposed to crime and violence in developing countries.

Narrowly rational

Bin Miao (Renmin University of China)

The revealed preference analysis allows the inference of underlying preferences from observable choices. Numerous studies have shown that choice data are generally rationalizable by some utility function for the given settings. This study examines whether choice data can be rationalized across settings. In an experiment, we compare portfolio allocations in two settings. In the first setting, the allocation is between two equiprobable Arrow securities. In another setting, it is between one risk-free asset and one risky asset that delivers either positive return or nothing with equal probability. We show that choice data is rationalizable within settings, but inconsistency is pervasive across settings. We further show that some heuristic rules, including 1/N rule and law of demand, may underpin the rationalizability of choice behavior. Our study contributes to the literature on revealed preference analysis, rule-based decision making, and the nature of risk preferences.

Individual and social preference in children—

Evidence from a field experiment in primary schools

Zhenxing Huang (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

Studying children’s individual and social preferences is important as they are developing fast during this period and can be used to predict individuals’ behavior in adulthood. We study risk, ambiguity, time and social preferences in a sample of 1268 primary school children aged 8-12 years (3rd, 4th and 5th grade in primary school) in China. In the study of social preference, we focus on egalitarianism, altruism and spitefulness within and across gender groups, and half of our subjects have been informed of the gender of the partner in the social game. Our findings show significant gender differences in risk preference and social preference. Specifically, boys are more risk seeking than girls, and are more likely to be altruistic with a partner of the same gender; while girls tend to be more egalitarian with a partner of the same gender. Our results mainly hold in the non-only child group and older child group, suggesting that gender group consciousness may emerge around age of 10-12, and emerge earlier for children in multi-child families. Furthermore, we find positive relationship between risk aversion and patience, and the number of siblings also have positive impact on patience.

分论坛讲述摘抄

分论坛1：

家庭照护与农村儿童早期发展——来自立地滋扰实验的字据

白钰 (中央民族大学)，王丹 (中央民族大学)，

吴本健 (中央民族大学)，史耀疆 (陕西师范大学)

中国农村清寒地区儿童靠近滞后风险，可界限化的早期综合滋扰对农村清寒地区东说念主力成本进步有至关紧迫的作用。当今我国开展的儿童早期发展滋扰研究已渐成体系，但较少探讨入户领导和小组行动综合照护对我国农村地区儿童早期发展的影响。本研究以我国农村地区1024名6–36月龄儿童偏激主要照养东说念主为样本，使用贝利婴幼儿发展量表第Ⅲ版(BSID-Ⅲ)、儿童发展常识问卷(KIDI-P)和家庭养育环境量表(FCI)等器用计算儿童早期发展水平及家庭养育环境，接纳立地滋扰实验评估家庭照护对3岁以下儿童发展的影响，养育师通过每月两次入户家访服务及每月一次家庭小组行动为滋扰组儿童提供早期发展综合滋扰。扫尾标明：(1) 样本儿童中领路、谈话、畅通和社会厚谊能力发展滞后比例辞别为52.1%、53.9%、31.4%和51.2%；(2) 接纳一年家庭照护滋扰后，儿童早期领路、畅通和社会厚谊能力测试步骤化分数辞别显耀平均提高0.291、0.228、和0.200个步骤差；(3) 照护滋扰主要通过改革儿童主要照养东说念主的养育行径、社会贸易和家庭养育环境影响儿童早期发展；(4) 家庭照护滋扰对非独生子女、主要照养东说念主为母亲、母亲学历在初中及以上和家庭境况细腻的儿童早期领路、畅通和社会厚谊能力作用更大；(5) 家庭处境不利的儿童更中意参与照护行动，养育师为女性、养育孩子数目、村医责任年限和亲密的照护关系与儿童参与率显耀正联系。分析揭示，对我国农村地区提供针对性的家庭照护有助于改善主要照养东说念主养育行径及家庭养育环境，证实儿童发展潜能，促进农村清寒地区东说念主力成本积存。

Reduce driving in peak hours with congestion charge and health knowledge:

A randomized field experiment

Duan Su (Beijing Jiaotong University), Fangwen Lu (Renmin University of China),

Kexin Geng (Vrije University Amsterdam, Beijing Jiaotong University),

Yu Wang (University of Leeds, Beijing Jiaotong University),

Yacan Wang (Beijing Jiaotong University)

Traffic congestion is a difficult problem faced by urban management all over the world. Can financial incentives and health knowledge change drivers’ departure time? We organize a field experiment with 422 Beijing drivers to measure the effects of congestion charges and health information delivering the relationship of driving habits and health. We find that congestion charges reduce 11.7% of trips departing between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., but the effects disappear soon after the treatment end. The information reduces 4.9% of trips departing between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. However, it lasts a longer and stronger effect after the treatment end and reduces the probability of departure between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. by 11.9%. The results also demonstrate that incentivizing drivers by the two treatments together does not bring better effects because the financial incentives crowded out the intrinsic motivation of health improvement.

三次分派与共同裕如：基于实验经济学的视角

郑捷 (清华大学)，何骈文 (清华大学)

王丁丁 (清华大学)，许彬 (浙江工商大学)

共同裕如是社会主义的践诺要求，亦然东说念主民民众的好意思好期盼。跟着国表里政事、经济和社会景色的变化，发展抵抗衡和收入差距过大已成为中国现行发展说念路上靠近的凸起问题。三次分派凭借其自觉、缓和、由企业和个东说念主主导的特色，弥补了首次分派和再分派中的市集失灵和政府失灵, 成为缩小贫富差距、统筹效率和公说念的紧迫技能。基于中国市集经济体制下的收入不对等阵势和收入分派轨制布景，本文想象了一系列实验以评估三次分派的政策效果，并检会了荣誉奖励和配对帮扶两种格式对三次分派的激励作用。实验扫尾显现，引入社会捐赠的三次分派机制有助于进步收入分派公说念。税收的价钱效应大约促进社会捐赠，荣誉奖励和配对帮扶的组合形势将进一步激勉社会成员参与捐赠的积极性。本文对三次分派的已矣旅途作念出了紧迫探索和改进，国度和政府可组合愚弄多种激励形势(物资激励、精神褒奖)和捐助形势(配对帮扶、不定向帮扶)，增强民众的慈善分享意志，拓宽民众的慈善资源渠说念，迟缓完善首次分派、再分派和三次分派协调配套的基础性轨制安排，迈向共同裕如。

Does training induce AI aversion?

Yu Gao (Peking University), Chong (Alex) Wang (Peking University),

Cong Wang (Peking University)

The last decade has witnessed rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) based on new machine learning techniques. Despite the hypes and prospects of AI-enabled decision-making support applications, accumulating evidence suggests AI aversion – a tendency to distrust and thus ignore AI advice, especially among experts. In a two-stage experiment, we show that compared to a control group with equivalent experience in a prediction task, trained experts are not less willing to incorporate AI advice in making predictions. Meanwhile, they are more reactive to AI's incidental performance. In follow-up experiments, we show that there is asymmetry in expert's reactions to AI's incidental performance. Compared to the control group participants, trained experts reduced their weight on AI advice more when an incidence where AI underperformed was observed, while they did not become more reliant when they were outperformed by AI. The training effect carries over to other tasks. We discuss the theoretical mechanism for the observed training effect from the perspective of construal-level theory and mental heuristics.

Competition and coordination in public transport: A mode choice experiment

Xiao Han (Beijing Jiaotong University), Yong Yang (Beijing Jiaotong University),

Rui Jiang (Beijing Jiaotong University), Bin Jia (Beijing Jiaotong University),

Ziyou Gao (Beijing Jiaotong University)

Public transport is a system for passengers by group travel, playing an important role in sustainable transportation by reducing traffic congestion and improving air quality. This study investigated the competition and coordination behavior in public transport mode choice with both positive and negative externalities. Subjects participated in a mode-choice game in which they were required to choose between bus and metro. The externalities in one public transport mode were determined by the characteristics of this mode and how many individuals choose it. We examined two treatments with different amounts of information: less information and more information, corresponding to non-implementing and implementing advanced traveler information systems, respectively. We derived three different equilibrium patterns (i.e., the Nash equilibrium, the mixed-strategy equilibrium, and the user equilibrium) as theoretical benchmarks to compare with the experimental findings, finding that the user equilibrium was achieved when more information was provided, whereas the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium was better to predict the choice behavior when providing less information. Furthermore, the comparison of the two treatments revealed the information paradox, indicating that information affected the public transport mode choice behavior, and more information might lead to worse outcomes. The spontaneous collective actions induced by less information and risk aversion could exert the benefits from positive externalities, thereby reducing travel costs compared with more information. Also, we adopted an adaptive learning model to reproduce the main findings in the experiments and provide a parsimonious explanation for the emergence of the information paradox.

Does correlation really matter in risk taking? An experimental investigation

Moritz Loewenfeld (University Toulouse 1 Capitole),

Jiakun Zheng (Renmin University of China)

Two prominent alternatives to expected utility theory, regret and salience theory, rely on the premise that correlation between acts impacts choices. Recent experimental studies on salience theory seem to provide evidence for such correlation effects. However, they fail to control for event-splitting effects (ESE). In the first part of this paper, we seek to disentangle the role of correlation and event-splitting in two settings: 1) the common consequence Allais paradox; 2) choices between Mao pairs. In both settings, we find evidence suggesting that recent findings supporting correlation effects are largely driven by ESE. Once controlling for ESE, we find no consistent evidence for correlation effects. In the second part of the paper, we test for correlation effects in a novel task that can detect correlation effects even when they are of second-order importance only. More explicitly, subjects choose between two lotteries with the same marginal distribution but different relative skewness, receiving either immediate feedback or not after choice. We find a precisely estimated null effect. Our results thus shed doubt on the suitability of salience and regret theory as theories of decision making under risk.

分论坛2：

Patient rating, second opinion and quality of online health care:

A field experiment

Haoran He (Beijing Normal University), Qian Weng (Renmin University of China),

Jingwen Xia (Beijing Normal University)

The health care market is a typical credence goods market characterized by pronounced information asymmetry between the buyers and sellers and often resulted in incentives for fraudulent behavior and inefficiency. The reputation system, commonplace in online markets, provides a potential means to regulate the sellers. The present paper explores the impacts of patient rating and second opinion on the quality of health care service by conducting a field experiment based on the standardized patient method with physicians on a Chinese online health care platform. The self-description of the condition provided to the physicians differs randomly in whether the patient emphasizes she pays attention to the online rating of the physician and whether the patient has already seen other physicians. We find that the effort of female physicians and the probability of their correct diagnosis can be significantly improved by the intervention condition combined by the second opinion and the patient rating. And patient’s emphasis on noticing physician’s rating significantly increases physicians’ overtreatment behavior.

Qualification, willingness, and gender bias in leader selection

Yutong Li (Renmin University of China), Xianghong Wang (Renmin University of China), Jie Zheng (Tsinghua University)

We examine how leader selection is affected by individual qualifications and willingness to lead. Groups were composed of male and female members. They earned income by answering questions individually and then in groups through group leaders. Group members voted for a leader on the basis of their information about ability, responsibility, and willingness to lead. We measured individual ability and responsibility before the group task. The experimental treatments focused on whether the members’ willingness to lead was revealed, and whether the group task emphasized ability or responsibility. In the ability treatment, group income was determined by the leader’s ability, and all group members received the same income. In the responsibility treatment, the group leader paid a leadership cost to submit a correct answer for the group and earned a lower income than the other group members. We found that female members were generally less willing and less likely to be selected as leaders. This gender difference could be explained by the willingness to lead; therefore, the number of votes for women increased when this information was not provided. Despite the expressed willingness, the elected female leaders were as effective as the male leaders and performed better in the responsibility treatment. 

How to pick the winner? A laboratory experiment on promotion mechanisms and individual performance

Xingyi Ruan (Tsinghua University), Jie Zheng (Tsinghua University)

Promotion is an important mechanism to incentivize workers in managerial practice. This study provides a first attempt to evaluate and compare two classes of mechanisms: the contest mechanisms and the voting mechanisms, in the scenario of promotion. We examine the effects of favoritism, randomness, and democratic opinions on promotion outcome and individual performance. The theory predicts that neither favoritism nor randomness can enhance performance under a contest environment, and that external voting outperforms internal voting. Our findings from a laboratory experiment confirm the prediction on favoritism, but suggest that there is gender difference regarding the performance comparison between the stochastic contest and its deterministic counterpart, which is new to the literature. The experimental results support the prediction on voting mechanisms and also show that under the external voting rule: (1) subjects’ performance is comparable to their counterpart in the contest environment; (2) subjects tend to dynamically adjust the winner-selection criterion for fairness consideration; (3) subjects are able to identify and thus discourage opportunistic players and can hence reduce moral hazard. Our findings indicate different impacts of the six mechanisms on working incentives, which may assist institutions in designing desirable promotion mechanisms.

晋升失败、晋升前功绩与懈怠效应——来自我国大型央属企业中层职工的教授字据

罗炜 (北京大学), 栗宇丹 (北京大学), 马玥 (北京大学)

以往研究标明，晋升失败的职工下一期证实会有所下滑，咱们称这种阵势为“懈怠效应”。本文以我国一家大型央属企业2014-2018年中层职工的面板数据为基础，具体研究了晋升失败职工 “懈怠效应”的影响身分。通过对晋升失败职工的功绩证实进行追踪，本文发现晋升前功绩越好的职工，晋升失败后功绩下滑越严重，这种阵势合乎相对洗劫表面的解释。进一步研究发现，在职工对自己晋升渴望较高时这种阵势愈加彰着。具体证实为，职工方位地区晋升概率越大，与已晋升职工个东说念主特征越访佛时，晋升前功绩与晋升失败后功绩变化的负联系关系更显耀。此外，与上司莫得简略的社会关系时，职工的“懈怠效应”会有所缓解，相似的前期功绩导致功绩下滑的幅度更小。后续考验标明这种前期功绩与“懈怠效应”的关系并不成被锦标赛表面以及均值转头所解释，也不成被更高的奖金等货币化抵偿所缓解。本文建议晋升前功绩是晋升失败后功绩变化的紧迫决定身分，从行径表面角度补充了晋升激励的后果，为我国国企激励实践提供了紧迫鉴戒。

激励机制能使职工拼搏直爽吗——一个来自平台公司实验的字据

刘潇 (清华大学), 王澍 (清华大学), 金星晔 (中央财经大学)

激励大约改革东说念主们的行径证实。本文通过一个房产中介平台的郊外实验，不雅察牙东说念主的“拓客”行动完成情况，并对不同奖励金额大小所带来的激励效应进行实证分析。研究发现，当奖励为高收益水平时，牙东说念主的行动完成率和行动完成次数皆有显耀提高，完成行动的时长也跟着激励的增多而显耀裁汰。进一阵势，本文还发现这种激励存在溢出效应和永远影响。就溢出效应而言，高收益组的牙东说念主提高了在平台的活跃程度，完成其他行动的次数也显耀提高。就永远影响而言，更高的激励会促使牙东说念主将行动中邀请的新用户震动为潜在的客户。本文的异质性分析发现，性别为男性、入职年岁更长、历史教授更丰富的牙东说念主更容易受到高收益激励的影响。

Sniping and limited-attention in online auctions

Zhigang Cao (Beijing Jiaotong University),

Yunlong Wang (University of Chinese Academy of Sciences),

Xiaoguang Yang (University of Chinese Academy of Sciences),

Lin Zhao (Southwestern University of Finance and Economics)

Sniping (bidding as late as possible) is prevalent in online auctions and harms the efficiency of trading. A common solution adopted by many platforms is changing the ending rule from hard-close to soft-close (i.e., the auction automatically extends for some period of time whenever a bid is submitted within the last few minutes of ending). Some recent empirical studies show that sniping may still be prevalent in soft-close online auctions. Does soft-close ending rule really solve the problem caused by sniping? We analyze a limited-attention model and argue that the answer is in some degree still yes. We prove that, as in hard-close auctions, sniping is the uniquely optimal best-reply to a large class of naive bidders in soft-close auctions. This explains why sniping may still be prevalent in soft-close online auctions. However, the winning probability and the expected profit by using the sniping strategy are both lower in soft-close auctions than in hard-close ones, and the expected revenue of the seller is also higher, demonstrating that soft-close ending rule works. We also provide additional empirical evidences from a large-scale data of Alibaba Judicial Auction.

分论坛3： 

Cooperation and coordination in heterogeneous populations

Xinmiao An (Beijing Normal University), Bin Chen (Beijing Normal University),

Marta Couto (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology), Yali Dong (Beijing Normal University), Christian Hilbe (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology),

Nianyi Wang (Beijing Normal University), Xiaomin Wang (Beijing Normal University),

Boyu Zhang (Beijing Normal University)

Inequality is ubiquitous in humans and other animal species. Individuals frequently differ in their endowments, productivities, their shares of rewards, and the positions they occupy in social hierarchies. In this paper, we study the effects of inequality on cooperation and coordination based on asymmetric threshold public goods games. In general, such threshold games have multiple equilibria, including a defective equilibrium in which no one contributes and a set of cooperative equilibria in which the total contribution equals to the threshold. We use a behavioral experiment to study three different scenarios: full equality, endowment inequality, and productivity inequality. For the given parameters, the experiment finds that endowment inequality is more of an obstacle to cooperation than productivity inequality. Interestingly, in successful groups, different subjects tend to make similar relative contributions (irrespective of their absolute endowments or their productivities). These results highlight some of the nontrivial effects that arise when heterogeneous populations aim to reach a consensus.

风险手脚社会决策下自利的借口：来自实验室实验的字据

董琬昕 (中国东说念主民大学), 郑家昆 (中国东说念主民大学)

社会决策每每是在风险要求下进行，Exley (2016) 研究了风险下的慈善捐赠行径，即个体在葬送自己福利的同期，中意在多大程度上改善他东说念主的福利。当存在我方与他东说念主利益的量度时，个体会将风险手脚不予以的借口，愈加厌恶他东说念主的风险，而虚拟对自己风险的厌恶程度。但是，现实生存中个体可能会葬送他东说念主的福利而从中获益，或者为造福他东说念主而葬送自己福利。因此，本文进一步分析风险在这些情形下承担的脚色，在实验中参与者需要为我方或匹配对象在有风险和无风险的收益或损失之间作念出一系列决策。当存在我方与他东说念主损失的量度时，个体相似证实出借口驱动型风险偏好，对他东说念主的损失风险愈加喜好，对自己损失风险的喜好程度虚拟。而风险类型、风险作用对象和概率大小会对借口驱动的风险偏好强度产生不同影响，当自己存在风险时，个体在中低概率的大风险上证实出较强的借口驱动风险偏好，且风险发生在收益域时借口驱动性更高；当对方存在风险时，个体在中高概率的小风险上更容易将风险手脚借口，且在损失风险下借口驱动风险响应更高。

Hedging by giving: Spiritual insurance and religious donations

Yu-Jane Liu (Peking University), Juanjuan Meng (Peking University),

Dalin Sheng (Tsinghua University), Yu Zhang (Peking University)

This paper analyzes donation behaviors from the perspective of religious beliefs. Utilizing a transaction-level data on income and donation dynamics from a high-income economy in Asia, this paper shows that higher income uncertainty predicts more donations, especially for religious donations, and for negative income uncertainty. This pattern is inconsistent with existing explanations of donation, and we pinpoint evidence that our results are explained by a “wishful thinking” or “spiritual insurance” channel. Indeed, we find that donating to religious organizations crowds out demand for market-based insurance products. Our results suggest that the “spiritual insurance” channel of religion can be influential for the donation and insurance markets even outside of underdeveloped markets.

Absolute versus Relative: Asymmetric framing and feedback in a heterogeneous-endowment public goods game

Xianghong Wang (Renmin University of China), Jie Zheng (Tsinghua University),

Lan Zhou (Renmin University of China)

Individual contributions to public goods can be framed in absolute or relative metrics. We examine the effects of asymmetric absolute-relative framing on contributions when group members are heterogeneously endowed. We develop a reference-dependent theory in which the absolute or relative contribution of others serves as a reference point. It predicts that the contribution is highest when high-income members are framed with relative metric and low-income members with absolute metric. We test our theory through an experimental design where the framing is either uniform (absolute or relative for all players) or asymmetric for players with different endowments. Experimental results confirm most of the basic treatment effects while challenge some of the asymmetric framing predictions. Our study contributes to a better understanding of how endowment, framing, and feedback affect individual play through belief and information learning in public goods provision.

社会逆境中的协调挣扎：基于框架和风险视角的经济学实验

郑捷 (清华大学), 彭咏淳 (清华大学)

社会逆境是利益突破中常见的基本结构，其代表了个体利益和社会利益无法协调时的矛盾。何如促进社会逆境中东说念主们的协调行径从而提高社会福利，一直是备受瞩目的紧迫课题。本研究将从获益/损失框架与不笃定性两个角度，使用表面展望与行径实验，在内生与外生环境下进行囚徒逆境中个体协调意愿的对比探究，并改进性地建立个体行径特征与协调意愿的筹备，为叮咛社会逆境的想象者提供滋扰建议。本文发现，损失框架中，风险和损失厌恶程度越高的个体越倾向于遴荐挣扎，而获益框架无此阵势。对于风险扫尾，个体根据协调意愿的高下，大皆存在自为性偏差，即在协调有风险时，高协调意愿群体更倾向于协调，而在挣扎有风险时，低协调意愿个体则更倾向于协调。在博弈情境的内生自主遴荐阶段，框架的遴荐手脚内生中介变量，使得损失与风险更厌恶的个体蚁合在获益框架中。扫尾显现各情境的协调率大皆更低，最终福利水平并不如平直指定的博弈情境。上述扫尾在永远博弈中也能强健存在。

The cross-section of extrapolative belief and the high-volume premium

Huaixin Wang (Tsinghua University)

Previous studies show that stocks with abnormally high volumes are associated with high subsequent returns. Using an extrapolation measure implied by survey evidence and theoretical models, I show that the high-volume premium is more pronounced among firms with low extrapolative value, whereas the premium is mitigated among firms with high extrapolative value. The difference in the high-volume premium between low- and high- extrapolative value firms can be predicted by DOX, the market-wide extrapolation level (Cassella and Gulen, 2018). I also provide evidence that the documented cross-sectional variation of the high-volume premium is not driven by stock visibility. The results indicate the extrapolative expectation is an important contributor to cross-sectional expected returns.

分论坛4：

Principals’ power, decision frames and delegation: Theory and experiment

Lu He (Central South University), Yulei Rao (Central South University),

Jianxin Wang (Central South University), Daniel Houser (George Mason University)

Principals frequently delegate morally questionable decisions despite having limited power over those to whom they delegate. An important open question is whether and why delegates accommodate principals’ selfish preference when principals hold only imperfect power over them. We shed light on this by developing a novel theory of the principal-agent relationship that incorporates decision frames. Our model predicts that if a principal holds any power over delegates, then delegates behave within a business frame and fully accommodate the principal’s selfish preferences in order to maximize their own expected earnings. Delegates act within a social frame and pursue equality in outcomes only when principals have zero power over them. We test our model using a modified dictator game where principals delegate decisions over amounts to allocate to recipients. We find delegates' allocation decisions do not significantly differ, and favor principals’ selfish preferences, whenever principals hold any power over delegates. Absent power delegates’ decisions favor equity. Further, we find delegates’ self-reported decision frame mediates power’s effect on delegates’ allocations. Our results offer new insights relevant to the design of delegation systems in organizations, and are of particular importance whenever there is interest in ensuring independent delegate decision making.

Information, strategic sophistication and equilibrium selection:

A quasi-continuous-time experiment

Zhi Li (Xiamen University), Jianxun Lyu (University of Edinburgh),

Yaoyao Xu (University of Edinburgh)

This paper experimentally tests the recent advance in evolutionary game theory by Oyama et al. (2015), according to which limited information about opponents’ behaviors can result in spontaneous equilibrium transitions among strict Nash equilibria. In our lab experiment, subjects in a group of 14 played a coordination game with three efficiency-ranked strict equilibria, under two informational treatments in quasi-continuous time. The least efficient equilibrium was made the status quo by using a novel design of default option: subjects were assigned the action of that equilibrium at the beginning of the game. We find that all groups transited away from the least efficient state. With more information, more groups transited to the most efficient equilibrium. The underlying mechanism is that more information can induce more subjects to engage in farsighted strategic deviations to a more efficient state. On the other hand, with less information subjects’ behaviors are less elastic to changes in the signals due to the associated high inaccuracy.

Coordination in the presence of background uncertainty

Lan Yao (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics),

Jiali He (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

We study how strategically irrelevant background uncertainty affects investment decisions characterized by input complementarity. We use a minimum-input coordination game, in which mutually high investment is Pareto-optimal, but investment levels above the minimum of others’ investments are costly and inefficient. We introduce “background” uncertainty in the form of a stochastic payment in every period of the game. Even when the realization of the random payoff is unknown, uncertainty is strategically irrelevant in that players best responses to opponents’ strategy profiles are invariant to realized states. We find that such background uncertainty nevertheless negatively affects efficiency and leads to lower investment choices. We find no such effect of background uncertainty in a bilateral investment setting. We attribute the difference to the importance of strategic uncertainty in coordination games, which is amplified in the presence of background uncertainty.

Identity disclosure and trust behavior:

Evidence from an online experiment on WeChat

Tai-Sen He (Nanyang Technological University),

Yupeng Li (University of Electronic Science and Technology of China), 

Yohanes Eko Riyanto (Nanyang Technological University)

We experimentally examined how trustee identity disclosure affects trustor trust behavior in an online environment on WeChat (a Chinese social media platform). We manipulated identity disclosure between subjects by varying the trustees' WeChat account names and the context of their greetings toward trustors in a group chat. We found that the trustors have a lower degree of trust in the trustees with disclosed names than the anonymous trustees, which contradicts the common intuition that identity disclosure contributes to prosocial behavior. Our study has direct real-world applications, especially in a world where increasingly more transactions and interactions are processed in an anonymous online environment.　

信息公开和风险变化对大众水池资源索求行径影响的实验研究——以海洋捕捞为例

罗俊 (浙江财经大学), 刘靖姗 (浙江财经大学),

黄佳琦 (浙江财经大学), 石荣浩 (浙江财经大学)

在感性东说念主假定和有限大众资源下，个体会为了利益最大化而尽可能多地索求大众资源。海洋资源是典型的大众水池资源，跟着海洋捕捞量的逐年增长，海洋环境受到严重交加。为了保护海洋生物资源，减少过度索求的发生，本文接纳实验经济学法子，通过设立进入大众池资源的遴荐和索求资源数目两阶段实验，来研究个体对大众池资源的索求行径。咱们还在实验中引入信息和风险两个紧迫身分，研究个体在面对各式风险变化情况下的大众池资源索求行径。实验扫尾标明，信息公开和风险变化经由皆会一定程度影响个体索求资源的遴荐和资源索求数目。论断可为大众治理提供政策启示，如公开资源索求东说念主数信息有助于个体调养资源索求数目，根据天气变化制定相应资源料理政策可幸免个体对风险的诞妄判断，从而导致的非感性索求行径。 

A simple experiment on simple Bayesian persuasion

Pak Hung Au (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology),

OSub Kwon (Nankai University), King King Li (Shenzhen University)

This experiment tests Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) in a simple setting. We adopt an experimental design where the Sender chooses a partition of the state space instead of an information structure. We find that 1) the Senders' strategies generally satisfy the optimal property that the weaker signal is fully revealing, but 2) their strategies are persistently suboptimal in the sense that the stronger signal is systematically set weaker than what the Receivers require to take the Senders' preferred action, resulting in persistently high rate of persuasion failure. However, 3) once we replace the Receivers with a robot who plays a known strategy, most Senders quickly learn to play the optimal strategy. This suggests that the key strategic element of Bayesian Persuasion is easy to understand for the Senders, although guessing what posterior probability a human Receiver would require to take the preferred action is a more difficult problem.

Strategic thinking and media bias: Evidence from Chinese Microblog users

Yihong Huang (Harvard University), Juanjuan Meng (Peking University),

Xi Weng (Peking University)

It has been shown that media bias contributes to belief polarization from the supply side. This paper provides a novel perspective from the demand side by testing whether news consumers are strategic enough to detect media bias. We propose a theoretical framework which shows that the tendency of reposting news with political inclination inconsistent with the media outlet’s general ideology is an indicator of strategic thinking. Combining both field data from Chinese Microblog users and an online experiment that exogenously varies whether news sources are revealed, we show both observational and causal evidence that Microblog users are more likely to repost inconsistent news, an indication of general strategic reaction. We also show that simply reminding people of media bias can make their decisions more strategic.

分论坛5：

Times, time pressure, and coordination

Ala Avoyan (Indiana University), Haoran He (Beijing Normal University),

Kelin Lu (Indiana University)

Team decision-making is frequently conducted under looming deadlines, and the time constraints can affect team communication and, consequently, team decisions. This paper studies teams' ability to communicate and come to an agreement under time pressure in a coordination game and consequent performance. We find that teams are significantly better at coordinating than individuals in the absence of time constraints, replicating similar findings in the literature. Teams under time pressure still target more efficient equilibria than individuals if they reach an agreement. However, disagreements are frequent, and teams no longer exhibit less miscoordination than individuals. Consequently, time pressure near entirely wipes out the gains from teams making decisions instead of individuals. We investigate the underlying mechanisms driving the overall effect of time pressure on performance by analyzing the communication content and by applying the experience-weighted attraction learning model.

公说念关怀下航运供应链中货代公司的协调决策研究

李剑 (中国海洋大学), 赵宇 (中国海洋大学)

在研究航运供应链公说念关怀行径对货代企业协调决策的影响中，本文以公说念中性下两个相互竞争的货代公司与单一船公司的二级航运供应链模子为基础，辞别接头了船公司对货代公司存在公说念关怀与货代公司对船公司存在公说念关怀两种情况。在对比不倒霉况平衡扫尾后，通过引入协议以开展货代公司与船公司的纵向协调协调。研究标明：(1) 货代公司横向协调仅会提高自己收益，而通过收益分享协议可已矣航运供应链全体利润最优；(2) 在竞争达到一定程度后货代公司才会遴荐进行协调，而船公司的公说念关怀行径仅会影响货代公司的横向协调决策。(3) 货代公司对船公司存在的公说念关怀不会影响货代公司的横向协调决策和纵向协调决策。(4) 货代公司的协调决策与航运供应链中市集的竞争程度互联系注，市集竞争越热烈，货代公司越会倾向横向协调决策。航运供应链中的公说念关怀只是会影响货代公司进行不同协调决策时市集竞争程度的范围。

行径助推分享单车堆积停放治理: 来自数字平台实地实验的字据

王雅璨 (北京交通大学), 詹紫琳 (北京交通大学),

苏端 (北京交通大学), 何浩然 (北京师范大学)

平台经济在通过数字技能已矣动态精确的供需匹配，提高资源树立效率的同期，其高频动态的贸易秉性也增多了用户行径料理的难度。因此，借助在线平台和海量数据已矣精确智能的行径滋扰，已成为数字时期用户行径料理的发展主义。本研究基于哈啰出行平台对南京市26,899名的确用户进行行径滋扰实验，探索即时教唆信息对用户轨范停放分享单车的辅导效果。研究发现，在用户潜在可能堆积停放的行程启动前发送教唆信息，大约虚拟约4%～6%的堆积停放。其中，利他信息(4.59%)和利他+社会轨范信息(5.82%)的滋扰效果略高于普通教唆信息(4.44%)；但由于用户在线下场景中容易不雅察到其他用户堆积停放行径，社会轨范信息的滋扰效果被同群效应挤出。滋扰效果还存在显耀的异质性：教唆信息的滋扰效果在非岑岭期彰着强于日夕岑岭；滋扰对实验前高频堆积停放用户的滋扰效果更强，但滋扰效果随滋扰次数的增多缓缓削弱。研究扫尾讲解了基于数字平台的精确、即时滋扰大约灵验辅导用户行径，提高数字平台的治理水平。

Mediation in ultimatum bargaining with inequality aversion:

A Bayesian persuasion approach

Yuxiang Cao (Shandong University), Zhuo Chen (Shandong University),

Shaoan Huang (Shandong University)

We examine optimal information disclosure by an informed mediator through Bayesian persuasion in a bilateral ultimatum bargaining game with two-sided incomplete information and inequality aversion. The information changes how the responder attributes the bidder’s aggressive offer, and hence her reaction to it. When the mediator maximizes the settlement probability, the optimal signal is a partial revelation where the buyer has a chance to confirm that the cost is low, but cannot confirm the cost is high. When the mediator maximizes the expected revenue of the bidder, the optimal signal persuades the seller to bid aggressively if the buyer is expected to be good-tempered.

Increasing the external validity of social preference games

by reducing measurement error

Xinghua Wang (Southern University of Science and Technology),

Daniel Navarro-Martinez (Pompeu Fabra University)

An increasing number of studies call into question the external validity of social preference games. In this paper, we show that these games have a low correlation with single pro-social behaviors in the field, but this correlation can be substantially increased by aggregating behaviors to reduce measurement error. We tracked people’s daily pro-social behaviors for 14 days using a day reconstruction method; the same people played three different social preference games on seven different occasions. We show that, as more pro-social behaviors and game rounds are aggregated, the games become much better predictors of pro-sociality. This predictive power is further increased by using statistical methods designed to reduce measurement error. These findings suggest that social preference games capture important underlying dispositions of real-world pro-sociality, and they can be successfully used to predict aggregated pro-social inclinations. This has crucial implications for the external validity and applicability of economic games. 

The value of response time information in supply chain bargaining

Fadong Chen (Zhejiang University), Yingshuai Zhao (University of Cologne),

Ulrich Thonemann (University of Cologne)

The research on supply chain bargaining has focused on agents’ choices, while the value of process data, such as response times, has received limited attention. We analyzed the value of response time information in supply chain bargaining and how the transparency of response times affects bargaining dynamics and outcomes. We conducted two laboratory experiments with multiround bargaining between a supplier and a retailer, where the supplier had private information about production costs. The retailer proposed wholesale prices to the supplier, and the supplier decided whether to reject or accept them. The experiments were composed of treatments with response time information (RT-Treatments) and those without response time information (noRT-Treatments). Suppliers’ response times were transparent to retailers in the RT-Treatment but were not transparent to those in the noRT-Treatment. We found that suppliers’ response times could indicate their preference strengths regarding retailers’ proposals. In the RT-Treatment, retailers could use suppliers’ response times to their advantage. Compared to those in the noRT-Treatment, retailers in the RT-Treatment made lower initial proposals. The final wholesale prices in agreements were also lower in this treatment, resulting in higher average retailer and channel profits but lower supplier profits. We demonstrated that response time information in supply chain bargaining revealed bargainers’ preferences and affected bargaining dynamics and outcomes. Bargainers could utilize their partners’ response times to improve their bargaining outcomes.

分论坛6：

Option-implied attention

Chenghu Ma (Fudan University), Xianzhen Wang (Fudan University)

This study proposes a novel approach to recovering investor attention and risk preferences from option prices by employing the weighted utility, and empirically tests it using China 50ETF options data. We find that the option-implied attention index is correlated with but more informative than existing proxies, and it exhibits stronger predictive power than volatility risk premium and investor sentiment in forecasting the market risk factor and tail risks. A quadratic increasing (decreasing) relationship exists between option-implied attention (risk aversion) and volatility risk premium. The forward-looking equity risk premium is mainly driven by attention shifts, where the rational component only accounts for about 5% of the total premium.

里面东说念主贸易锚定效应与股价信息含量——基于价钱信息学习视角的表面与实证

潘京臣 (中南财经政法大学), 顾露露 (中南财经政法大学)

锚定效应在经济行动中广阔存在。本文基于价钱信息学习视角，愚弄感性预期平衡模子(REE model)框架讲解，领有信息上风的里面东说念主在贸易时相似存在锚定效应，而股价信息含量大约缓解里面东说念主贸易决策的锚定偏差。本文接纳A股上市公司里面东说念主贸易数据，选取52周价钱比率手脚锚定变量，对表面模子论断进行了实证考验。扫尾标明，里面东说念主的贸易决策存在彰着的锚定效应，52周价钱比率越大，里面东说念主减持的可能性越高，而股价信息含量大约灵验缓解里面东说念主贸易决策受52周价钱比率的影响。本文还基于“沪港通”贸易轨制进行了双重差分考验，扫尾标明成本市集怒放相似大约缓解里面东说念主贸易的锚定效应。进一步研究发现：(1) 里面东说念主贸易可能存在多个心理锚值，且早期心理锚值对里面东说念主贸易决策的影响较大；(2) 当里面东说念主贸易锚定效应较强时，其获取逾额答复的能力也较低。本文的研究论断有助于加深对里面东说念主贸易行径的领路，对股价信息含量联系研究也具有一定的启示作用。

处置效应与时刻偏好关系研究

王疏雨 (西南财经大学), 胡又欣 (西南财经大学)

本文以准双曲贴现函数为表面基础，研究投资者处置效应和时刻偏好之间的关系。对于相似大小的收益，更早得到比更晚得到产生更大的正着力；反之，对于相似大小的损失，更早得到比更晚得到产生全皆值更大的负着力，因此本文猜测投资者可能倾向于更早卖出赚钱股票，更晚卖出损失股票，继而产生处置效应。研究发现，被试在实验室和模拟的确市齐集均存在处置效应，在实验室实验中即时偏好会强化被试的处置效应，在模拟的确市集实验中时刻偏好会强化被试的处置效应。此外，风险偏好对处置效应影响不彰着，男性被试和投资更各样化的被试处置效应更弱。本研究为处置效应的开始寻找新的依据，有助于深化了解投资者行径，探讨投资者系统性策略偏差的内在心理机制，这将有助于投资者制定合理的投资决策。

通过关联机制促进 ESG 投资：一项实验研究

陈姝 (上国际国语大学), 王嘉琦 (上国际国语大学), 杨晓兰 (上国际国语大学)

将企业的ESG实践与其潜在投资者的投资决策联系联是否能促进ESG投资？为回答该问题，本文通过一个带有的确ESG实践激励的股票报价实验，想象了持关联联、答复关联两种机制并研究它们何如影响投资者对ESG股票的支付意愿。在没关联联机制时，企业的公益捐赠与投资者决策无关(基准组)。在关联机制下，惟有投资者买到ESG股票，企业才会进行公益捐赠。其中，持关联联组的捐赠数额固定，而答复关联组的捐赠数额与股票答复正联系。实验扫尾标明，比较于基准组，投资者在持关联联组中对ESG股票的支付意愿更高。分性别研究发现：男性投资者为ESG股票支付的溢价开始于两种关联机制的作用而非股票的ESG属性，且持关联联机制的作用更显耀，体现出效果驱动的行径模式；女性投资者为ESG股票支付的溢价开始于其ESG属性而非关联机制的作用，体现出属性驱动的行径模式。临了，男性投资者的利他偏好在持关联联机制进步ESG股票溢价的经由中有正向调度作用，而女性投资者的利他偏好在ESG属性进步其股票溢价的经由中莫得调度作用。

Sequential search with ex-post uncertainty

Yilin Li (University of California Santa Cruz),

Shuchen Zhao (Dongbei University of Finance and Economics)

In traditional sequential search models, players face ex-ante uncertainty prior to each search but obtain certain outcomes after the search. The players' reservation value tends to decrease with their level of risk aversion. We propose a modified sequential search model with ex-post uncertainty where the uncertainty cannot be fully wiped out by the search. Under this scenario, risk averse players tend to increase their reservation value and extend their search duration. We also test our theory in a laboratory experiment with a search game to track subjects' behavior, and with the Multiple Price List and the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task to elicit the subjects' risk preference. The experimental results verify our theoretical predictions.

War and peace in the boardroom: Pre-vote communication, herding behavior,

and boardroom politics

Di feng (HEC Laussane), Hang Sun (Dongbei University of Finance and Economics),

Shusen Qi (Xiamen University)

We examine theoretically the consequences of pre-vote communication of corporate directors. Without assuming costs to dissension, we show that the revealing of directors' opinions in the communication causes directors to herd and consequently reduces dissension. We further show that factions on board can strategically exploit such pre-vote communication to play politics and exert disproportionate influence. Our model also predicts the typical strategy of mala fide information controls over opponent directors in faction fights. This paper provides managers and regulators with a framework to analyze board communication strategies, such as compulsory meetings of independent directors, and also offers an economic analysis of corporate directors' legal rights to information.

分论坛7：

政府补贴、市集界限与企业改进行径——一个基于高新技能产业的实验研究

罗俊 (浙江财经大学), 戴瑞楠 (浙江财经大学),

张真 (中国东说念主民大学), 王华春 (浙江财经大学)

关节中枢技能对推动我国经济高质地发展具有要紧意旨，面对西洋国度日益严峻的技能阻滞，高新技能企业自主改进成为我国科技自立自立程度中的紧迫议题。本文想象了一个个体决策实验以模拟高新技能企业分娩与研发的景象，并检会了这一景象下补贴激励、市集界限对改进决策的作用。在此基础上研究了个体偏好对研发插足的影响，并通过对比企业的践诺研发强度与讲演研发强度识别了企业垄断研发诳骗补贴的行径。实验扫尾标明，最初，无门槛补贴对企业的改进行径具有接续、强健的激励作用；其次，风险厌恶者、短视者即使面对界限更大、收益更高的增量市集，也不会在研发前期增多插足；临了，面对政府补贴政策，企业的讲演研发强度存在彰着的阿谀效应, 而践诺研发强度则否则。

Package deals in multi-issue bilateral bargaining

Amnon Rapoport (University of Arizona),

Darryl A. Seale (University of Nevada Las Vegas), Tamar Kugler (University of Arizona), 

Eyran J. Gisches (University of Arizona), Yun Jie (South China Normal University)

This manuscript proposes a novel mechanism of multi-issue bilateral bargaining under incomplete information. A seller and a buyer negotiate the prices of multiple items by submitting price offers (asks) and counteroffers (bids) in which the items are traded as a package deal. Trade occurs if the sum of the individual profits across all items is non-negative. We experimentally compare a simultaneous protocol, where the two sets of price offers are submitted and opened simultaneously, to a sequential protocol, where traders exchange offers and counteroffers with a deadline before submitting their final asks and bids. Our results show that the participants concluded more trades in the sequential protocol, that they shaved their price offers considerably, and that they often traded-off price offers, sustaining negative profit on one or more items to increase the probability of a successful trade.

All-pay contests in the lab

Feng Zhu (Nankai University), Yohanes E.Riyanto (Nanyang Technological University),

Siqiang Yang (Nankai University)

This paper experimentally investigates all-pay contests (Siegel, 2009), where economic agents are asymmetrically positioned and compete by making irreversible investments. We compare four treatments in a between-subject design, with a simple parameterization of Siegel (2009)’s all-pay contest model, to test its theoretical predictions. We find that, while the treatment effects are consistent with the theoretical predictions, average payoffs are significantly lower, and that Siegel’s closed form formula is not fully sufficient to determine players’ equilibrium payoffs. We then examine subjects’ bidding strategies and find that bidding strategies are especially close to theory predictions when there are no losing players, which further implies that there is no overbidding in such situations.

基于高阶信息的主不雅信用评价系统优化有规划——表面与实验研究

龚冰琳 (华东师范大学), 符晓宁 (华东师范大学), 张予捷 (华东师范大学),

陈可一 (华东师范大学), 黄妩霜 (华东师范大学), 于宏瑞 (华东师范大学)

互联网具有高度匿名性和遮掩性，因此网罗市集效率与绿色网罗生态建造很是依赖于信用评价系统。当今互联网主不雅评价系统存在评分步骤异质性严重、信誉分散程度低、极点数据影响大、评分自遴荐性强、小样本评分流毒大、评分轮廓统计量信息性差等诸多问题。本研究引入高阶信息，想象了信用评分轮廓统计量矫正有规划，将主不雅评分根据个体评分特征进行步骤化再盘算均值，以期大约处罚当今评价系统的上述问题，提高主不雅评价系统的可靠性和参考价值，最终增进市集效率。本研究以柠檬市集为布景，分为表面和实验两部分，一方面构建表面模子，寻找表面平衡，揭示影响机制；另一方面进行立地甩掉实验，考证表面展望和评价系统矫正有规划的效果。研究发现，将高阶信息引入评价系统的矫正有规划大约灵验改善评分散布、提高评分的参考价值，灵验改善评分步骤异质、样本量小、自遴荐等变成的问题。

投标代答理影响投标价吗？——来自荷兰式拍卖的实验考验

杜宁华 (上海财经大学), 杨毅 (上海财经大学)

网上拍卖的投标代理为竞拍者带来了出价的便利。本文通过实验室实验，比较了不同投标代理机制下的荷兰式拍卖。实验扫尾标明，当投标代理为强制选项时，代答理虚拟竞拍价钱；现代理为竞拍者的自主选项时，遴荐代理的竞拍者会提高竞价，而未遴荐代理的竞拍者会虚拟竞价。从心理心理角度的行径假说对实验扫尾进行解释：强制遴荐下，投标代理使东说念主与东说念主间的竞争震动为东说念主机夹杂竞争，从而虚拟了对竞争到手的渴慕，竞买者出价更低；自主遴荐下，比较自行参与拍卖，使用软件代理丧失了出价的机动性，在遴荐投标代理后为了幸免过后后悔，竞拍者出价更高。实验扫尾还标明，从卖家收益角度动身，不含代理的设立要优于相应的含代理的拍卖设立。这一扫尾有意于领路拍卖方少量主动在荷兰式拍卖中提供投标代理服务的阵势。

Can strategic delegation solve the hold-up problem?

Yadi Yang (Nanjing Audit University)

This paper investigates the potential of strategic delegation to mitigate the hold-up problem. In transactions with an investment stage followed by a bilateral bargaining stage, the lack of commitment induces underinvestment. Strategic delegation can work as a commitment device if a principal sets an appropriate incentive scheme for an agent. This paper conducts a laboratory experiment in which a player can delegate the allocation decision in the bargaining stage to an agent. The payoff of the agent can be linked with bargaining results via the incentive scheme. This enables the investor to make a credible threat to reject opportunistic offers, or the non-investor to make a credible promise to limit exploitation. The experiment finds more frequent investments and fewer opportunistic behaviors when the principals properly incentivize their agents.

分论坛8：

个东说念主主义、集体主义与分派行径——基于临了通牒博弈的实验研究

焦静静 (华南师范大学), 董志强 (华南师范大学), 赵俊 (华南师范大学)

  个东说念主主义、集体主义会何如影响东说念主们的分派行径？现存文件还莫得充分研究这一问题。不同价值体系对东说念主们的行径决策有紧迫影响，著作通过开展实验室实验来探究个东说念主主义、集体主义对个体分派行径的影响。临了通牒博弈是研究分派行径的常用实验范式，在此基础上，著作立地将被试分为两组，辞别进行个东说念主主义、集体主义启发，探究启发后两组被试的行径互异。研究发现：两组提议者的分派行径莫得显耀互异，但个东说念主主义启发后回话者的接纳行径显耀更少，导致个东说念主主义启发组比集体主义启发组的分派有规划达成率更低。进一步对比了两组被试的实验收益，接纳全样本对比发现，个东说念主主义启发组的提议者和回话者获取的奖金占比皆显耀更低；接纳分派有规划达成样本对比发现，个东说念主主义启发组的提议者获取的奖金占比也更低，但回话者获取的奖金占比显耀更高。著作还发现提议者出价低于我方时，个东说念主主义启发组的回话者闭幕比例显耀更高。

Group lying with negative externality

Lan Yao (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics),

 Chong Zhou (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

We use a modified die rolling experiment to study whether negative externality affects a group’s decisions about whether to cheat. Our results show that group members are less likely to lie when faced with a passive out-group player only if two members of the group share an unequal payment for lying. The less-paid party in the group plays a dominant role in the honesty decision by proposing the true number more frequently in arguments for group coordination.

Public goods provision in a network formation game

Simin He (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics),

Xinlu Zou (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

We investigate how people coordinate on public goods provision in a network formation game. In this game, people first form network by bilateral linking, with or without a link cost, and then make contribution to public goods that benefit the people directedly linked in the network. Theoretically, there are two coordination patterns: splitting and alternation, and the latter is more efficient. Further, a higher link cost may help achieve alternation via a smaller network, which can result in higher efficiency. We vary the link cost in the laboratory experiment, and find that people dominantly converge to splitting instead of alternation, and although they tend to build smaller networks when the link cost increases, they fail to alternate even in the two-player network.

物资激励、方针制定对体育考验行径的影响研究:

基于小学生跳绳畅通的立地滋扰实验

罗俊 (浙江财经大学), 石荣浩 (浙江财经大学),

黄佳琦 (浙江财经大学), 刘靖姗 (浙江财经大学)

为推动落实健康中国政策，国度建议要“加强学生体育行动”、“培养学生形成细腻的健康生存习尚”。咱们尝试检会物资激励、方针制定能否匡助个体改善体育考验行径中跨期遴荐的非感性偏好，能否“助推”个体增多体育考验行径。咱们以小学生群体为实验对象开展跳绳畅通的立地滋扰实验，设立物资激励、方针制定和内生方针物资激励滋扰框架，不雅察不同滋扰框架放学生畅通量、方针制定及畅透习尚等行径的互异。实验扫尾显现，物资激励能显耀增多穷乏考验个体的考验行径，效果随时刻先增后减。个体在单纯的方针制定时因过度自信而没能显耀促进践诺考验行径，在物资激励下将更审慎的制定方针。内生方针物资激励能接续促进整个个体的考验行径，且效果优于物资激励。

新冠疫苗接种的行径经济学：基于行径实验与公众调研的研究

魏立佳 (武汉大学), 郭铱婷 (武汉大学), 陆方文 (中国东说念主民大学)

新冠疫苗等传染病疫苗的接种是最灵验、最低廉的疾病把稳技能，而疫苗接种时又大皆存在风险厌恶、亲社会性、“不主动接种”偏误等行径影响身分。为了完成疫苗接种和疾病把稳的方针，疫苗接种的决策行径就成了紧迫的科研问题。本文愚弄激励行径实验和问卷量表调研相连络的格式，对大学生群体、公众群体在成东说念主疫苗接种决策时的行径偏好进行了研究。在两个群体中同期发现，亲社会性是影响接种疫苗决策的紧迫行径身分。此外，本文还对公众群体中父母春联女疫苗接种的决策问题进行了研究，发现风险承受能力较高、“不主动接种”偏误较小的父母更倾向于让子女接种疫苗。临了，本文针对行径偏好对疫苗接种的影响机制，建议了进行滋扰的政策建议。

家长教养格式与儿童行径偏好：一个家庭互动的实地实验

陈叶烽 (浙江大学), 杨雯渊 (浙江大学), 罗干松 (浙江大学),

王宇 (浙江大学), 李飞 (湖南农业大学)

探究家庭教养格式对儿童行径偏好的影响偏激机制一方面对于证实家庭老师积极作用有着紧迫的理讲价值，另一方面对于从微不雅家庭视角领路大众政策的制定也具有紧迫的现实意旨。本文创造性地想象和实施了一个家庭互动的实地实验，并在湖南省怀化市新晃侗族自治县这一欠发达地区通过立地抽取3所学校共招募了450对家庭配对样本。通过偏好导出、信念导出和互动实验三部分任务，咱们从微不雅个体决策视角导落发庭里面的的确互动行径，理会了家庭里面家长的教养格式插足决策与儿童相应的行径偏好改革决策。实地实验中枢扫尾标明，最初，家长们乐于滋扰和影响孩子的行径决策，最为常用的教养行径是推选和留言。其次，信息对家长教养意愿与教养行径具有紧迫的影响，对孩子行径遴荐的信念及信念更新和其他家长的滋扰行径皆会使家长调养自己教养行径。第三，家长的“言传”和“身教”两种格式皆会显耀影响儿童的行径决策，且儿童的决策变动主义与家长插足的教养格式主义一致。临了，机制分析发现“身教”通过信念更新和效法效应两个门道改革儿童行径决策；一方面，儿童减少信念偏差，不再效法有偏信念中的家长行径；另一方面，儿童以家长的确决策为新效法对象并向其逼近。

分论坛9：

Novel rituals and effort provision

Jianbiao Li (Shandong University), Yanan Zhang (Shandong University),

Xiaofei Niu (Shandong University)

Rituals are characterized by an absence of rational motivation, but why do rituals present in the heavily goal-oriented and hyper-rational workplaces. To address this question, we created novel rituals in the lab—devoid of historical meaning and culture—and then explore the causal effects of novel rituals on effort provision within the framework of gift-exchange. Our results show that employers pay their employees more for performing rituals because they hold the belief that performing rituals would increase employees’ effort. However, in fact, we find that employees reduce their effort contributions in response to equivalent wage levels after performing rituals due to higher wage expectation.

Does retirement make people more risk averse?

Lingguo Cheng (Nanjing University), Yunfeng Lu (Nanjing University)

We investigate whether retirement makes people more risk averse. Using a nationally representative household survey dataset from urban China, we adopt a novel local randomization regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of retirement on risk attitudes. We find that male retirees become more risk averse after they have retired while female retirees do not, therefore the impact of retirement on risk attitudes is gender-specific. We also find some evidence suggesting that the decrease in income flow after retirement might be the main channel through which retirement affects risk attitudes. Our finding has important theoretical and policy implications.

Participation payment, selection bias and treatment effects:

Evidence from a lab experiment

Huizhen Zhong (South China Agricultural University, Chapman University),

Cary Deck (University of Alabama),

Daniel J. Henderson (University of Alabama, Institute for the Study of Labor)

While laboratory experiments have become a mainstay of economic research because of the control afforded by the researcher, generalizability is potentially limited by selection bias in participants. Previous studies have attempted to examine how people who volunteer to be in an economics experiment differ from people who do not, but this paper seeks to examine how this selection bias impacts treatment effects. Specifically, we recruit potential participants using a range of advertised guaranteed payments from $5 to $15 and then examine how the participation payment affects three commonly studied treatment effects: changes in risk taking with an increase in stakes, changes in charitable donations with the introduction of a matching subsidy, and changes in reasoning in a p-beauty contest with the introduction of cognitive load. Although we find typical treatment effects, we find little impact of the advertised participation payment on those treatment effects. A follow-up study varies the advertised participation payment from $5 to $100. Surprisingly, the participation rates were nearly identical in both studies and did not vary substantially with the advertised payment.

Zodiac year and risk preference: Evidence from laboratory experiments

Xiaomeng Zhang (Nanjing Audit University),

Nan Wu (Central University of Finance and Economics), Wenyu Zhou (Zhejiang University)

In Chinese culture, the zodiac year of one’s birth is often associated with bad luck. This astrological superstition dates back more than two thousand years and is still prevalent in modern Chinese society. Using novel experimental techniques, we find evidence suggesting that people in China are significantly more risk averse during their zodiac years. Moreover, this evidence also indicates that people may be more pessimistic about the likelihood of experiencing unfortunate events during their zodiac years. Based on these experimental results, we illustrate how the zodiac year superstition can affect firms’ and individuals’ economic behaviors in real life through two case studies.

The persistent effect of biased narratives

Manwei Liu (Nanjing Audit University), Sili Zhang (University of Zurich)

Can people counteract biased narratives through subsequent information acquisition when they are fully aware of the bias? Using an online experiment in an apolitical setting, we investigate this question by first randomly assigning participants to read biased narratives that contain the same facts and then offering them the opportunity to acquire additional arguments. We document three main findings. First, participants shift their attitudes toward the standpoint of the randomly given narrative, knowing that the narrative is biased. Second, the opportunity to read additional arguments does not prompt participants to adjust their attitudes. Third, when evaluating subsequent arguments, participants see arguments aligned with the randomly given narrative as more convincing, which likely contributes to their inability to counteract biased narratives. Taken together, our results demonstrate a persistent effect of biased narratives even though people are fully aware thereof.

北京师范大学经济与工商料理学院行径与博弈决策实验室

实验室简介

实验室依托北京师范大学经济与工商料理学院，同期整合北京师范大学“双一流”学科数学和系统科学等多学科研究力量，围绕多项国度和省部级名堂，以及国际科研协调名堂，凝练出博弈论、行径经济学、复杂经济系统、处事经济学等特色研究主义。实验室汇注了北京师范大学以及国表里联系领域的主干研究力量，国际化水平高、研究激情繁荣、改进能力凸起，研究后果发表在PNAS、One Earth、Operations Research、Journal of Labor Economics、Games and Economic Behavior、Experimental Economics等高水平期刊。

研究领域

博弈论和行径经济学是连年来经济学的热点研究领域，诱导了繁多顶级经济学家的兴致，其中的代表性东说念主物包括Reinhard Selten, Daniel Kahneman Vernon Smith, Alvin Roth，Richard Thaler等诺贝尔经济学奖获取者。当今，国内的行径与博弈决策研究相对分散，本实验室方针打造国内一流的行径与博弈决策研究基地，把执才略域研究的发展趋势，推动跨学科的交叉研究，通过与国内伯仲科研院是以及寰宇盛名研究机构的广阔疏导与协调，形成具有显然特色的国际化研究中心。实验室主要研究主义包括博弈论、行径经济学、复杂经济系统、处事经济学等，重心关注东说念主类协和谐公说念的演化，社会网罗对经济系统的影响，反腐政策想象偏激效果评估，脑怒与反脑怒，非物资激励对劳能源市集的影响等学科前沿问题。

研究团队

中心主任：何浩然，张博宇

研究东说念主员：何浩然（经济与工商料理学院）欧美无码，张博宇（数学科学学院），朱敏（经济与工商料理学院），徐慧（经济与工商料理学院），董雅丽（系统科学学院），Marcus Roel（经济与工商料理学院）